ABSTRACT Modern block ciphers can be used for designing security schemes to meet the security requirements in underwater acoustic sensor networks. The substitution boxes (S-boxes) used in block ciphers must have good cryptographic properties to resist various attacks. The difficulty in the design of S-boxes is that the cryptographic properties of S-boxes have no obvious distribution. In this paper, we investigate the certain subgraph of the Cayley graph of the symmetric group to get some information about the distribution of the cryptographic properties of S-boxes. Based on the information obtained, an algorithm for designing Sboxes with good cryptographic properties is proposed. The security analysis shows that the preferred S-box constructed by the proposed algorithm has good cryptographic properties.
I. INTRODUCTION
Underwater Acoustic Sensor Networks (UASNs) have been widely used for various underwater applications [1] . However, UWSNs are vulnerable to various threats and attacks because there are many limitations in UWSNs [2] . Modern block ciphers play a vital role in the design of WSNs security schemes. As the only nonlinear component in a block ciphers, S-boxes are used to provide confusion introduced by Shannon [3] . The S-boxes used in block ciphers must have good cryptographic properties to resist various attacks. In other words, the practical S-boxes meet several criteria, i.e., bijection, nonlinearity, strict avalanche criterion, bit independence criterion [4] , differential approximation probability [5] and linear approximation probability [6] .
A lot of literature have been devoted to the design of S-boxes. The methods for constructing S-boxes include algebraic methods and random methods, and so on. Algebraic methods have received increased attention because S-boxes based on algebraic methods have good cryptographic properties [7] . For example, the well-known AES S-box is based on algebraic methods. However, the algebraic cryptanalysis shows that S-boxes based on algebraic methods have weakness for the algebraic attacks [8] . Various random methods such as [9] - [18] are proposed to obtain S-boxes with better
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Guangjie Han. cryptographic properties. But, there exists a gap between the cryptographic properties of S-boxes based random methods and AES S-box. Some optimization methods have been applied to enhance the performance of S-boxes based random methods. Wang et al. [19] transformed the problem of constructing S-boxes into a traveling salesman problem and proposed a method to construct S-boxes based on chaos and genetic algorithm. Qin et al. [20] introduced the artificial bee colony algorithm to the design of S-boxes. Wang et al. [21] proposed a method combining chaos and optimization of enhancing nonlinearity to design S-boxes. Tian and Lu [22] designed a method based on the intertwining logistic map and bacterial foraging optimization for constructing S-boxes. Farah et al. [23] presented a method based on chaotic map and teaching-learning-based optimization for obtaining S-boxes. Khan et al. [24] reported a systematic method combining chaos and optimization of enhancing differential approximation probability for designing S-boxes. Ahmad et al. [25] proposed a method based on artificial bee colony optimization and chaotic map to construct S-boxes. However, the gap between the cryptographic properties of S-boxes based on these methods and AES S-box is still exists.
The difficulty in the design of S-boxes is that the cryptographic properties of S-boxes have no obvious distribution. In other words, randomly choosing two S-boxes, we do not know whether one of the two boxes has better cryptographic properties than the other unless we calculate the criteria of the two S-boxes. Thus, although we know that there exist some S-boxes have better cryptographic properties than the S-boxes based random methods, we cannot find these S-boxes using common optimization methods.
It is known that all bijective n × n S-boxes constitute the symmetric group of degree 2 n . Given a generating set of the symmetric group, we can construct the Cayley graph of the symmetric group [26] . Furthermore, we can get a subgraph of the Cayley graph by deleting the directed edge from vertex f to vertex g in the Cayley graph if the vertex g has no better cryptographic properties than vertex f . Based on the fact that the vertices with zero out-degree have better cryptographic properties than the vertices with non-zero out-degree in this subgraph, we propose an algorithm for designing S-boxes with good cryptographic properties. The main contributions of this paper are as follows: 1) An efficient algorithm for designing bijective S-boxes with the desired criteria is proposed.
2) The l-differential uniformity is proposed as the generalization of the differential uniformity to accurately evaluate the input/output XOR distribution table. 3) An 8 × 8 S-box with good cryptographic properties is obtained by the proposed algorithm.
The rest of this paper is as follows. Section 2 presents necessary notations and results. Section 3 describes the proposed algorithm in details. Section 4 gives security analysis of the proposed method. The last section is the conclusions of this paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we will introduce some necessary concepts and results.
A. S-BOX
Denote B = {0, 1}. For a positive integer n, the elements in B n can be written as the integers in the range of 0 to 2 n −1 because the vector (x 1 , · · · , x n ) in B n corresponds to the integer n i=1 x i 2 n−i . In this sense, B n = {0, 1, · · · , 2 n − 1}. An n × m S-box is a function from B n to B m . An n × m S-box is bijection implies m = n. Any bijective n × n S-box can be seen as a permutation of B n .
A transposition is a permutation that swaps two elements of B n and fixes all other elements of B n . Given two elements i and j in B n , the transposition swaped i and j can be written as (ij) in cycle notation.
Given two permutations f and g, we say that they are affine equivalent if there exist two affine permutations a 1 and a 2 such that g = a 1 fa 2 .
The set of all permutations of B n together with composition is the symmetric group S B n on B n .
The set S a n = {(0i) : i ∈ B n \ {0}} is a generating set of S B n .
Biham and Shamir introduced the differential cryptanalysis, which is based on the use of the imbalances in the input/output XOR distribution table [5] . The differential uniformity of the permutation f of B n is defined as
where
B. WELL-ORDER SET
A total order is a binary relation on a set X , which is antisymmetric, transitive, and total [27] . A set paired with a total order is called a totally ordered set. For each (non-strict) total order ≤, there is a strict total order <, which is defined as The lexicographical order on the Cartesian product A × B is a total order.
A well-order on a set X is a total order on X with the property that every non-empty subset of X has a least element in this ordering. A set X together with the well-order is called a well-ordered set.
The set of all natural numbers N together with the standard ordering ≤ is a well-order set.
For a positive integer k, the k-ary Cartesian power N k together with the lexicographical order is a well-ordered set.
C. CAYLEY GRAPH
Suppose that G is a group and S is a generating set of G. The Cayley graph = (G, S) of G with respect to S is a colored directed graph constructed as follows [26] :
• Each element g of G is assigned a vertex: the vertex set V ( ) of is identified with G.
• Each generator s of S is assigned a color c s .
• For any g ∈ G, s ∈ S, the vertices corresponding to the elements g and gs are joined by a directed edge of color c s . Thus the edge set E( ) consists of pairs of the form (g, gs), with s ∈ S providing the color.
Given a group G, a generating set S of G, a well-ordered set X and a function ω from G to X , there is a subgraph ω of = (G, S), which is defined as V ( ω ) = V ( ) and E( ω ) = {(g, gs) : g ∈ G, s ∈ S, ω(gs) < ω(g)}. We say that the subgraph ω is the Cayley ω-subgraph of G with respect to S, which is denoted by ω (G, S).
III. THE PROPOSED ALGORITHM
In Sections 3.1 and 3.2, we will use the differential uniformity to describe the proposed algorithm in details. In Sections 3.3, we will describe the proposed algorithm for common cryptographic properties. VOLUME 7, 2019 A. CAYLEY D-SUBGRAPH We are interested in the permutations whose differential uniformity is lowest in S B n . For convenience, we say that f ∈ S B n is global minimum in
We have known that S a n = {(0i) : i ∈ B n \ {0}} is a generating set of the symmetric group S B n ; N together with the standard ordering ≤ is a well-order set; computing the differential uniformity of permutations gives a function D (Eq. 1) from S B n to N. We can get the Cayley D-subgraph of S B n with respect to S a n , i.e., D = D (S B n , S a n ).
If f ∈ S B n is the vertex whose out-degree is equal to zero in D , then D(fs) ≥ D(f ) for every s ∈ S. For convenience, we say that f ∈ S B n is local minimum in S B n if f is the vertex with zero out-degree in D .
It is obvious that the global minimum in S B n must be the local minimum in S B n . It reminds us that we can find the global minimum in S B n by finding all the local minimum in S B n . The local minimum in S B n also have low differential uniformity, then we can find the permutation with low differential uniformity in S B n by finding the vertex with zero out-degree in D (G S , S).
The Algorithm 1 running in D returns the vertex whose out-degree is zero in D , i.e., the local minimum in S B n . randomly choose s in S t , update g = gs, go to step 2; 5: else 6: return g. The running time of Algorithm 1 is related to the size of S a n and the length of the longest path in D . More precisely, the running time of Algorithm 1 is O(|S a n | · L · d(n)), where |S a n | is the size of S a n , L is the length of the longest path in D and d(n) = O(n2 2n ) is the running time of computing the differential uniformity.
Algorithm 1 includes some unnecessary computations because Algorithm 1 only needs one direct successor of a given vertex, but not all. Algorithm 2 running in D can avoid unnecessary computations in Algorithm 1.
As the running time of computing the differential uniformity is O(n2 2n ), Algorithm 2 will take a long time for large n. We can decrease the running time of Algorithm 2 by reducing the size of S a n .
For a positive integer n > 1, denote
Algorithm 2
The Improved Algorithm 1 1: Randomly choose g in V ( D ) and set S t = S a n ; 2: while S t = ∅ do 3: randomly choose s in S t ; 4: if D(gs) < D(g) then 5: update g = gs and set S t = S a n ; 6:
delete s in S t ; 8: end if 9: end while 10: return g.
then T B n is a subgroup of S B n and
is a generating set of T B n . According to [28, Lemma 1] , for any f ∈ S B n , there exists g ∈ T B n such that f is affine equivalent to g. As the differential uniformity is affine invariant, the global minimum in S B n must be affine equivalent to the global minimum in T B n , i.e., we can find the global minimum in S B n by finding the global minimum in T B n . Similarity, Algorithm 2 running in D (T B n , S b n ) returns the local minimum in T B n . Generally, given a small-size subset S of S B n , let G S denote the subgroup of S B n generated by S, then Algorithm 2 running in D (G S , S) returns the local minimum in G S .
Although Algorithm 2 running in D (G S , S) are likely not to return the global minimum permutation in S B n . However, the differential uniformity of the permutation returned by Algorithm 2 running in D (G S , S) may be lower than running in D (S B n , S a n ). As we will show in Section 4, given a specially subset S of S B n , Algorithm 2 running in D (G S , S) can return the global minimum permutation in S B n . Because Algorithm 2 running in the disconnected Cayley D-subgraph is more likely to return a local minimum than in the connected Cayley D-subgraph, we need to increase the connectivity of the Cayley D-subgraph.
B. CAYLEY D L -SUBGRAPH

Figure 1 is D (T B 3 , S b 3 ). It is obvious that
The differential uniformity is a rough evaluation of the input/output XOR distribution table because if two permutations have the same input/output XOR distribution table then they must have the same differential uniformity, but not vice versa.
We introduce a detailed evaluation of the input/output XOR distribution table, which is called l-differential uniformity. The l-differential uniformity of the permutation f of B n is defined as
where 
We have known that N 2 2n together with the lexicographical order is a well-ordered set and computing the l-differential uniformity of permutations gives a function D l (Eq. 2) from S B n to N 2 2n . As like section 3.1, given a suitable subset S of S B n , we can find the permutation with low differential uniformity in S B n by finding the vertex with zero out-degree In order to show the huge differences between the Cayley D-subgraph and the Cayley D l -subgraph, we give D (G S , S) and D l (G S , S) in Figures 3 and 4 , respectively, where S = {(0 1), (2 3), (4 5), (6 7)} is a subset of S B 3 . 
C. CAYLEY ω-SUBGRAPH
In the design of S-boxes, several criteria for S-box should be considered. Based on these criteria for S-box, there is a function ω from S B n to N k . Given a suitable subset S of S B n , let G S be generated by S, then we can find the permutation with good cryptographic properties in S B n by finding the vertex with zero out-degree in ω (G S , S). The detail of the algorithm based on the Cayley ω-subgraph is as follow:
1) Choose the desired criteria for S-box.
2) Construct the function ω from S B n to N k based on the selected criteria. 3) Choose a suitable subset S of S B n . 4) Run Algorithm 2 in ω (G S , S) to return the vertex with zero out-degree in ω (G S , S).
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, security analysis will be used to evaluate our proposed algorithms. Algorithm 2 is used for experimental analysis. For the efficiency of Algorithm 2, the differential uniformity is considered to be the desired criteria for S-box. The l-differential uniformity D l is considered as the function ω from S B n to N 2 2n because the l-differential uniformity is detailed. Table 1 shows the distribution of differential uniformity of permutations which are returned by Algorithm 2.
As in Table 1 , Algorithm 2 running in D l (S B n , S a n ) has better performance than running in D l (T B n , S b n ) when n = 3, 4, 5. However, Algorithm 2 running in D l (T B n , S b n ) has better performance than running in D l (S B n , S a n ) when n = 6. Because Algorithm 2 running in D l (T B n , S b n ) is more efficient than running in D l (S B n , S a n ), we only run Algorithm 2 in D l (T B n , S b n ) for the efficiency when n = 7, 8.
Algorithm 2 always returns the permutation whose differential uniformity is the lowest in S B n when n = 3, 4. But it is not true when n ≥ 5. Figure 5 shows the relation between differential uniformity of S-boxes and number of iterations in Algorithm 2. It can be seen that Algorithm 2 can return the local minimum after about 200 iterations. Thus Algorithm 2 is an efficient algorithm for finding S-boxes good cryptographic properties.
If we choose the subset S = {(0 1), (2 29), (3 19) , (4 22) , (5 8), (6 13) , (7 15) , (9 23) , (10 17) , (11 24) , (12 14) , (16 25) , (18 28) , (20 27) , (21 31 Table 2 .
Next, we give the criteria for the 8 × 8 S-box in Table 2 . The algorithm for calculating the nonlinearity (NL), strict avalanche criterion (SAC), bit independence criterion (BIC), differential approximation probability (DP) and linear approximation probability (AP) can be found in many literature such as [22] . Note that D(g) = 2 n · DP(g) for a given n × n S-box g. The NL, DP and LP of S-box in Table 2 are (110,110,112,112,110,108,108,110), 0.023 and 0.086, respectively. The details of BIC-NL, SAC and BIC-SAC of S-box in Table 2 are shown in Tables 3, 4 and 5, respectively. Table 6 lists six criteria of AES S-box and some existing S-boxes. It can be seen that S-box in Table 2 has better cryptographic properties than the existing S-boxes. Furthermore, there is only a small performance gap between S-box in Table 2 and AES S-box.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In order to meet the security requirements in UASNs, an algorithm for designing bijective S-boxes with the desired criteria has been proposed in this paper. The proposed algorithm is based on the fact that the vertex with zero out-degree in Cayley ω-subgraph ω (G S , S) for a given subset S of S B n have good cryptographic properties, where the function ω from S B n to N k is given by the criteria for S-box. In order to accurately evaluate the input/output XOR distribution table, we proposed the l-differential uniformity as the generalization of the differential uniformity. In fact, all criteria for S-box can be generalized like this.
Security analysis show that the proposed algorithm can return S-boxes with good cryptographic properties. As shown in Figure 5 , the proposed algorithm is an efficient algorithm for finding S-boxes good cryptographic properties. Thus, the proposed algorithm can be used to construct key dependent S-boxes for block cipher in UASNs. When n = 5, Algorithm 2 running in D l (G S , S) is likely to return the permutation with the lowest differential uniformity in S B n if we choose a suitable subset S of S B n . We also construct an 8 × 8 S-box with better cryptographic properties than the S-boxes obtained by the existing methods using Algorithm 2 through choosing a suitable subset S of S B 8 . Thus, the future work of this research is to choose a suitable subset S of S B n such that the permutations with the best cryptographic properties lie in G S .
